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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BAILMENTS - STRICT LIABILITY - CONTRACT FOR LEASE OF TRUCKS
CREATES AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR THE DURATION
OF THE LEASE.
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service
(N.J. 1965)
Plaintiff driver was injured when a truck leased by his employer
from defendant failed to stop in time to avoid colliding with an overhead
bridge. The vehicle was one of nine leased on a long term basis, defendant
agreeing to service, maintain and repair the trucks during the term of the
lease. Plaintiff, contending that the accident was caused by a defect in
the truck's braking system, based his cause of action upon the defendant's
alleged negligent inspection or maintenance of the leased vehicle or, in
the alternative, on a breach of defendant's warranty that the truck was fit
for the use contemplated by the parties. The trial court dismissed the
warranty claim and submitted to the jury the issues of defendant's negli-
gence and plaintiff's contributory negligence. From a finding in favor of
defendant, plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court of New Jersey certified
the case on its own motion and reversed the lower court, holding that
the contract gave rise to an implied warranty of fitness for the intended
use extending over the duration of the lease. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
The proposition that a negligent manufacturer should be responsible
for any injury to an ultimate purchaser or user of his product is a well
established principle of tort law. As early as 1852, it had been decided
that where an article was intended for human consumption the ultimate
consumer, if injured, should be permitted to recover from the manufac-
turer, even in the absence of privity of contract.J This rationale was first
extended beyond food and drink in the landmark case of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., Inc.2 There the court ruled that the absence of privity
of contract was not a bar to recovery where the manufacturer's product,
if negligently made, would cause injury to one who could be classified as
an ultimate consumer.3 However, the problems inherent in establishing
1. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
2. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature
gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger
there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the
purchaser and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manu-
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negligence on the part of the manufacturer frequently caused the plaintiff's
case to fail. Consequently the aggrieved consumer was often forced to
resort to an action founded upon breach of warranty. But since the decision
of Winterbottom v. Wright4 it had been necessary to establish privity of
contract between the parties, even where the seller's negligence caused
permanent injury to the plaintiff. Consequently, to afford some measure
of relief, the courts began to entertain actions for breach of warranty
brought by the ultimate consumer in cases where the article sold was
intended for human consumption. 5 Thus, in Decker v. Capps,0 a non-
negligent manufacturer who processed and sold contaminated food to a
retailer was held strictly liable for injuries sustained by the ultimate con-
sumer. It was only gradually, however, that this approach was adopted
in other areas. Perhaps the most significant development occurred when
the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the case of Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc. 7 Emphasizing the mass advertising of the defendant
automobile manufacturer, the court granted recovery for personal injuries
sustained by the wife of the ultimate purchaser, stating:
. . . under modern marketing conditions, when a manufacturer puts
a new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes its purchase by
the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use
as such accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser.8
This implied warranty was available only to those who were in the
distributive chain,9 and then only if they could show physical injury result-
ing from a defect in the product. 10 Recovery for mere economic loss un-
accompanied by physical injury continued to be limited to situations where
the warranty was express, or where plaintiffs could show that they had
purchased the product in reliance on the express representations of the
manufacturer." Nevertheless, the same court that decided Henningsen
4. 10 M.&W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
5. Drury v. Armour & Co., 140 Ark. 371, 216 S.W. 40 (1919); Boyd v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 80 (1915).
6. 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
7. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Mrs. Henningsen sustained serious injuries
when her husband's new 1955 Plymouth suddenly veered into a brick wall. The proofs
adduced at trial indicated that a defect in the steering mechanism of the car caused
the unexpected and costly turn.
8. Id. at 388, 161 A.2d at 84.
9. PROSS8R, ToRTs § 97 (3d ed. 1964). "So far as the plaintiff is concerned,
no one has yet recovered for personal injuries, on the basis of strict liability without
privity, who could not fairly be called a consumer of the product, or at least a user."
See, e.g., Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963) ; but cf.
Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964), noted in 10 VILL. L.
Rnv. 607 (1965), where a hotel bartender was held to come within the statutory
term "buyer."
10. Martins Ferreira v. Jayess Corp., 214 F. Supp. 723, 728 (D. N.J. 1963).
11. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d
399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) ; accord, Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St.
2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965), where recovery was granted to the buyer of a Rambler
for his economic loss due to latent defects in an automobile purchased in reliance
upon claims of the manufacturer made through mass advertising media. See also,
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recently ruled, in Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc.,'2 that a pur-
chaser may maintain an action directly against the manufacturer based on
an implied warranty of fitness even in the absence of privity, and despite
the fact that plaintiff's damages are limited to his loss of bargain. In the
companion case of Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.13 the court held there
is an implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new housing which
survives the deed, at least where the vendor is a mass housing developer
and the vendee, with little opportunity for inspection, must necessarily rely
on the former's representations.
In these cases the court abandoned all pretense that contract law
governs the implied warranty of merchantability imposed by law, and
phrased its decisions in terms of strict liability in tort.14 This is, in effect,
an enterprise liability, one of the incidents of doing business, and should
be classified as a new tort; a new duty is imposed upon the manufacturer
enabling the ultimate consumer to come within the protection of the law. 15
Precedent for such an approach may be found in the case of Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., l6 where Justice Traynor stated that
the implied warranty is imposed by law, is not part of the contract, and
does not depend upon any advertising of the manufacturer. 17 The mere
presence on the market of the manufacturer's product is sufficient to give
rise to the implied warranty, as that alone constitutes a representation that
the product is fit for the normal use for which it is intended. This rationale
strongly suggests the appropriateness of stating the resulting legal theory
in terms of strict liability in tort, as the traditional criteria for maintaining
warranty actions have clearly been abandoned.
An examination of the underlying policy considerations for the imposi-
tion of an enterprise liability leads to the conclusion that the instant court
was justified in extending it to bailments for hire. Of the many practical
reasons advanced for the imposition of strict liability on manufacturers,
those which have found most favor with the courts are the ability of the
manufacturer to distribute the loss more equitably and the necessity of
compensating one who relied upon the representations of the manufacturer
Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965), where the plaintiff
trucker recovered lost profits for the breach of an express warranty that the truck
he purchased from the dealer, but made by defendant, would perform satisfactorily for
his purpose. But cf. the dissent of Justice Peters, which argues for the enterprise
liability concept to be applicable in all cases.
12. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). Carpeting that developed a noticeable line
after purchase from a retailer was held to constitute a breach of the manufacturer's
implied warranty of fitness.
13. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). A hot water heating system that allowed
water to go directly into the water taps, thus severely scalding the 16 month old son of
the occupier of the home, was held to be a breach of an implied warranty of habitability.
14. See notes 12 and 13 supra.
15. For a detailed discussion of the implied warranty of merchantability, see
generally, Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DUQUESNE L.
REv. 1 (1963); Jaeger, Products Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 NOTR8
DAME LAW. 501 (1964).
16. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
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made through mass advertising.1 8 These factors would appear to be equally
applicable to a lease transaction.
Harper and James state that a warranty may be annexed to a trans-
action if one party is in a better position to know the defect of quality that
may occur, control the occurrence of that defect, distribute the resulting
loss, and anticipate the danger should a defect occur. In addition, there
must be reliance on the knowledge and representations of one party by the
other.19 Clearly, these elements are present in the typical lease transaction.
This position is encouraged to some extent by the Uniform Commercial
Code, in which the framers, in a comment to section 2-313,2o take the posi-
tion that warranties need not be limited solely to sales transactions.
It has been pointed out that the law imposes strict liability on a manu-
facturer to protect the consumer in situations where he cannot protect
himself, and to prevent one who induces the public to buy his goods by
representing their fitness from escaping liability by invoking the defense
of lack of privity.21 Yet there appears to be no basis for assuming that
the consumer is in any better position to protect himself in a lease than
in a sale of goods.
Another relevant consideration is the avoidance of the costly circle
of litigation by indemnification from retailer to wholesaler to manufac-
turer.2 2 In this context, at least one court 23 has imposed liability on a
manufacturer at a point between the inducement and the actual purchase
by awarding a fork-lift driver damages for personal injuries sustained
while using the vehicle on a trial basis. The court stated that the plaintiff's
rights should not depend on the intricacies of sales law, and that the
defendant, by putting this vehicle into the hands of a contemplated user,
warranted that such vehicle was safe for the purpose for which it would
be used.24 In addition, there was no allegation of negligence in the case.
If these considerations form the real basis for implying a warranty
in a sales transaction, there is little reason not to apply a similar warranty
to a bailment for hire when the product leased, if defective, could easily
18. See, e.g., Putman v. Erie City Manufacturing Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.
1964) ; Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (App. D.C. 1962)
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
19. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 28.19 (1956).
20. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, comment 2 provides in part:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties
made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the warranty
sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of
case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined
either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract. They may
arise in other appropriate circumstances such as in the case of bailments
for hire. ...
21. PROSSER, TORTS § 97 (3d ed. 1964). Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., supra note 7; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra note 16.
22. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d
399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
23. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964).
24. Id. at 6. In reference to the implied warranty of merchantability being
restricted only to sales, it was said that this should be interpreted as a description
of the situation that has most commonly arisen rather than a deliberate limitation of
the principle to cases where the product had been sold.
WINTER 1966]
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cause serious harm to the ultimate user. Prior decisions holding the lessor
of trucks,25 automobiles,2 6 and heavy industrial equipment 27 liable for any
injuries resulting from his negligence or failure to inspect or to make
repairs serve to point out the dangers inherent in such transactions and
the necessity of increasing the protection afforded the consumer. The risk
of harm is great; the representation of the lessor that the vehicles are fit
for the lessee's purpose is of major proportions; and the resulting reliance
of the lessee is bound to be great.
Although an enterprise liability is easily absorbed by such large cor-
porations as Chrysler,28 Levitt,2 9 and Hertz, 0 it could spell financial
disaster for much smaller businesses. The Restatement of Torts8 l would
afford some relief by imposing strict liability only on those organizations
in the business of selling the particular product warranted. Thus, an in-
dividual cannot be held to warrant a product he may sell but once. But
the ability of the smaller company to absorb this added cost of doing
business is still a consideration to be weighed most seriously. If the war-
ranty is based solely on the manufacturer's placing his products in the
stream of trade, then the warranty must apply to all. And if it is based on
other considerations, it is difficult to imagine any touchstone except contract
law which will leave the area in a confused state once more.
The instant decision, although certainly a landmark case in the area
of implied warranties and worthy of much attention, is not based on any
intricate legal theory. Five years ago, the same court held an automobile
manufacturer liable for injuries caused by a defect in one of its cars,
even though there was no privity between the parties and no negligence
could be shown.8 2 Today this court imposes a similar liability upon a
leasing corporation, basing its decision on the same policy considerations
that governed the decision in Henningsen. It is submitted that this decision
will be followed to the same extent as was Henningsen, and that the
Supreme Court of New Jersey must now be considered to represent the
most advanced legal thought in the area of implied warranties.
Richard G. Greiner
25. E.g., Yarbrough v. Ball U-Drive System, Inc., 48 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Sup. Ct.
1950) ; Campbell v. Siever, 253 Minn. 257, 91 N.W.2d 474 (1958).
26. E.g., Donner v. Morse Aut. Rental, Inc., 147 So. 2d 577 (Fla. D. Ct. App.
1962) ; Hertz Driv-Ur-Self Stations v. Benson, 83 Ga. App. 866, 65 S.E.2d 191 (1951).
27. E.g., Lambert v. Richards-Kelly Construction Co., 348 Pa. 407, 35 A.2d 76(1944); Booth Steamship Co. v. Meier & Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958).
28. Supra note 7.
29. Supra note 13.
30. Supra note 26.
31. RSTATMENT (SEcoND), ToRTs § 402A (1965), provides in (1) (a)
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and . ...
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS - ALIMONY - VALID SEPARATION AGREE-
MENT No BAR TO SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREE
BASED ON THE AGREEMENT.
McMains v. McMains (N.Y. 1965)
In 1944 plaintiff wife and defendant husband entered into a separa-
tion agreement providing for, among other things, $100 a month support
for the wife and stipulating that the terms of the agreement might be
incorporated into a subsequent divorce decree but that the agreement
should not be considered merged or cancelled by such decree. The wife
thereafter obtained a divorce decree which incorporated the stipulated
support payments as alimony. In 1964 plaintiff wife brought an action to
increase the amount of alimony because, she alleged, by reason of poor
health and heavy medical expenses the sum was insufficient for her basic
needs and she was in danger of becoming a public charge. A trial court
order, modifying the original judgment by granting the increase in alimony,
was overturned on appeal to the Appellate Division. The New York Court
of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division on the law, holding that a
separation agreement, valid and adequate when made, continues to bind
the parties, but that this does not prevent a later modification of the decree
by increasing the alimony when the wife shows she is unable to support
herself and is in danger of becoming a public charge. McMains v. McMains,
15 N.Y.2d 283, 206 N.E.2d 185 (1965).
It is common practice for a husband and wife, upon agreeing to sepa-
rate, to enter into an agreement establishing their respective property and
custody rights, and the amount of support which the husband will be
required to pay to his spouse. The consideration for such agreements is
usually found in the common law and statutory obligation of the husband
to provide continued support for his wife.' Under the common law doc-
trine of coverture all agreements to which a married woman was a party
were void, and an agreement between husband and wife was no exception. 2
Today, since the doctrine of coverture has been abrogated by enabling
statutes and court decisions, most jurisdictions will permit and enforce
such agreements3 if they are found to be fair and adequate when made and
1. North v. North, 100 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. 1936).
2. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 331 (1931).
3. Moreover, since the law favors out of court settlements, and since they violate
no public policy, courts will frequently commend such agreements.
[W]hen a separation has actually taken place, or when it has been fully decided
upon, and the articles [of the separation agreement] contemplate a suitable pro-
vision for the wife and children, or an equitable and suitable division of the
property, the benefits of which both have enjoyed during the coverture, no
principle of public policy is disturbed by them; on the contrary, if they are fair
and equal, and are not the result of fraud or coercion, reasons abundant may be
found for supporting them, in their tendency to put an end to controversies, to
prevent litigation, and to give to the wife an independence in respect to her support
which without some such arrangement she could not have under the circumstances.
Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich. 563, 571-73 (1877).
WINTER 1966]
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are not in their effect promotive of divorce.4 If one of the parties subse-
quently obtains a divorce, as is usually the case, the courts will frequently
look to the agreement in establishing the amount of alimony, and a few
courts will feel compelled to incorporate the terms of the support agree-
ment into the divorce decree if it is found to be valid and fair to the wife.
5
Where the amount of alimony is based on the provisions of a prior
separation agreement a question frequently arises as to the power of the
court subsequently to modify the decree on the petition of one of the
parties. To find such power initially, the courts must look directly to the
divorce and alimony statutes, since at common law final divorces were not
given and hence alimony as currently conceived was not a legal concept.6
Moreover, a statute which simply grants the power to award alimony is
generally interpreted by the courts not to grant the additional power to
modify the award unless the court specifically reserves such power in its
original order. 7 As a consequence, most statutes also grant the court
power to modify the award "as justice so requires," thereby automatically
writing a reservation into all decrees. 8 To what extent this power of the
court is dependent upon a separation agreement incorporated in the award
is a many faceted problem which has caused considerable confusion in the
law of divorce. The confusion arises from the loose language which many
courts use in describing the relationship between the separation agreement
and the decree embodying its terms. For example, some courts say that
incorporation is no more than a ratification of the contract, and therefore,
under ordinary contract principles, the amount of the award cannot be
changed without the consent of both partiesY Other language pointing to
the same conclusion is that the parties are "sui juris" and the obligations,
4. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS §§ 3(2)-
3(3), 3(5) (1964). For a discussion of the requirements of fairness, see In re Beeler's
Estate, 175 Kan. 190, 262 P.2d 939 (1953). For discussions of agreements promotive
of divorce, see Panzi v. Panzi, 157 Cal. App. 2d 772, 321 P.2d 847 (1958) and 10 VILL.
L. REv. 171 (1964).
5. Meyer v. Meyer, 5 App. Div. 2d 655, 174 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1958) ; Kyff v. Kyff,
286 N.Y. 71, 35 N.E.2d 655 (1941).
6. Alimony, originally, was the method used by the ecclesiastical courts of
England to enforce the husband's duty to support his wife after separation. In those
times only divorces a mensa et thoro, or limited divorces, were given. Upon marriage
title to the wife's property became absolute in the husband, and a divorce a mensa
et thoro did not revest title in the wife; therefore, such authority was absolutely
necessary to protect the wife. Divorces a vincudo matrimonii, or absolute divorces,
with attendant alimony, are of purely statutory origin. MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 319, 25.
7. E.g., Gillespie v. Andrews, 78 Cal. App. 595, 248 Pac. 715 (1926) ; Stratton
v. Stratton, 73 Me. 481 (1882) ; Going v. Going, 144 Tenn. 303, 232 S.W. 443 (1921).
Contra, Ortman v. Ortman, 203 Ala. 167, 82 So. 417 (1919) (dictum) ; Emerson v.
Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 87 Atl. 1033 (1913). Cases are collected at Annot., 71 A.L.R.
741 (1931).
8. Karlin v. Karlin, 280 N.Y. 32, 19 N.E.2d 669 (1939). Statutes are collected
at 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 277 (1932). See particularly, N.Y. DOMESTIC
RELATIONS LAW § 236.
9. Conolly v. Conolly, 16 Ohio App. 92 (1922); Henderson v. Henderson, 37
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being contractual in nature, are not alterable without mutual consent.' 0 Still
others consider it a consent judgment not subject to judicial scrutiny in
the absence of fraud." And a few say that to disturb the agreement
amounts to the impairment of the obligations of a contract. 12 Other cases,
as will be seen later, hold that the contract in no way affects the court's
power to modify the award ;13 this on the theory that the power is statutory
and may not be constricted by private contract. In addition, decisions
within the same jurisdiction will often appear inconsistent.
Some courts solve the problem very simply by saying that where a
prior agreement is incorporated into the decree it becomes merged therein,
that is, has no independent existence, and so cannot hinder subsequent
modification of the alimony award. 1 4 However, the majority of the courts,
including New York, apparently reluctant to rule out of existence a con-
tract which assures to the wife the security of a minimum level of support,
hold that the prior agreement not only survives the decree but is strength-
ened by it to the extent that a later collateral attack on the agreement as
unfair is not permitted under familiar principles of res judicata.15 So the
narrow question presented in these jurisdictions is to what extent the court
will forego its statutory power to modify a divorce decree in sustaining
the validity and effect of a contract which was at least impliedly sanc-
tioned and accepted by the court as a fair measure of support. In answer
to this question a general rule is often stated "that 'where a court has
the general power to modify a decree for alimony, or support, the exercise
of that power is not affected by the fact that the decree is based on an
agreement entered into by the parties to the action'."' 6
The New York law was first formulated in the case of Galusha v.
Galusha,'7 where the court flatly stated that in an action brought by the
wife for divorce on the ground of adultery the court had no power to set
aside the separation agreement without the consent of both parties and no
power to make an additional award for the support of the wife beyond the
amount agreed upon, at least where that amount was not insufficient to
10. See Note, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 392, 397 & n.7 (1937).
11. Hargis v. Hargis, 252 Ky. 198, 66 S.W.2d 59 (1934).
12. Eddy v. Eddy, 264 Mich. 328, 249 N.W. 868 (1933).
13. Johnson v. Johnson, 104 Cal. App. 283, 285 Pac. 902 (1930); Wilson v.
Caswell, 272 Mass. 297, 172 N.E. 251 (1930). See also Southworth v. Treadwell, 168
Mass. 511, 47 N.E. 93 (1897) ; Blake v. Blake, 75 Wis. 339, 43 N.W. 144 (1899).
14. E.g., Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal. 2d 605, 160 P.2d 15 (1945) ; Adler v. Adler,
373 Ill. 361, 26 N.E.2d 504 (1940) ; Corbin v. Mathews, 129 N.J. Eq. 549, 19 A.2d 633
(1941) ; Prime v. Prime, 172 Ore. 34, 139 P.2d 550 (1943) ; Ex parte Jeter, 193 S.C.
278, 8 S.E.2d 490 (1940). But see Note, 63 HARV. L. Rnv. 337, 339 (1950), where it
is postulated that the doctrine of merger is technically incorrect. Undoubtedly it was
in view of these cases that the parties to the agreement in the present case expressly
stipulated that the agreement if incorporated in the divorce decree was not to be
considered merged therein.
15. E.g., Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 26 N.E.2d 265 (1940). This is
especially so where the agreement provides that it will survive the decree. See Talia-
ferro v. Taliaferro, 125 Cal. App. 2d 419, 270 P.2d 1036 (1954) ; DeViney v. DeViney,
269 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1954).
16. Annot., 166 A.L.R. 675, 676 (1947).
17. 116 N.Y. 635, 22 N.E. 1114 (1889).
WINTER 1966]
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support the wife.' 8 Subsequently, in Goldman v. Goldman,19 a case widely
cited in other jurisdictions, a valid separation agreement made by the
parties guaranteed the wife $21,000 a year as support. The wife obtained
a divorce which incorporated the contractual provisions for support. Ten
years later the ex-husband sought a reduction in the alimony to $14,000
a year, and it was the wife's contention that under the Galusha case it
could not be changed without her consent. The court, in allowing the
reduction, sought to distinguish the Galusha case by saying that neither
that decision nor any other New York case ever made the drastic penalty
of contempt of court applicable to a breach of a marital obligation action
available for the enforcement of a contract, 20 and that to maintain the level
of alimony at its present rate would in effect be giving the wife a contempt
of court remedy for breach of contract. The court was careful to point
out that its decision in no way affected the wife's rights to the $21,000
established under the contract and she retained all her usual remedies
for breach.
In justifying its decision the court in the instant case made three
distinct points: first, that the court is granted by the statute the power
to award and modify alimony decrees and that the parties to a divorce
action can do nothing to take away this power ;21 second, that a husband
has both a common law and a statutory duty to continue to support his
wife, and any agreement purporting or so construed as to relieve him of
that duty would be void under the General Obligations Law ;22 third, that
the Goldman case, and others, read in the light of their results, indicate
that the court has always possessed the authority to modify a decree
based on a separation agreement between the parties.
The first of these points would withstand all challenge in view of the
clear and unequivocal language of the statutes which grant wide discretion
to the courts in the matter of alimony.23 This alone, however, does not
answer the question of the extent to which the court, in fairness and equity,
should refrain from using this power. The second proposition may be
challenged by reference to the language of Kyff v. Kyff,2 4 cited by the
majority in other contexts, to the effect that while a husband may not
under the law contract away his liability to his wife for her basic support,
as by a payment of a lump sum in lieu of alimony, he may, in a proper
18. Id. at 643, 22 N.E. at 1116.
19. 282 N.Y. 296, 26 N.E.2d 265 (1940).
20. Id. at 301, 26 N.E.2d at 267.
21. N.Y. DoMESTIc RELATIONs LAW § 236.
22. N.Y. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-311.
23. N.Y. Dom4STIc RELATIONS LAW § 236; N.Y. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW
§ 5-311.
24. 286 N.Y. 71, 35 N.E.2d 655 (1941). "[A] wife may not voluntarily release
her husband from his duty to support her and neither may the husband for a con-
sideration purchase exemption from that duty .... Nonetheless, where the husband
and wife agree upon the measure of the support which they deem proper for the
benefit of the wife, then the court will not compel the husband to support the wife
in a greater sum .. .unless the amount agreed upon is plainly inadequate." Id. at 74,
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case, decide with her on a suitable measure of support which, if approved
by the court, cannot subsequently be questioned. As to the third point,
the Goldman case is clearly inconsistent on its facts with the present case
in that the court in the former granted a reduction in the husband's alimony
while carefully declining to disturb the right of the wife to the full amount
of the agreed sum under the contract, while in the latter, by requiring the
husband to pay more than the amount established by the contract, the
effect is to abrogate any rights the husband may have enjoyed under the
agreement. As the dissent in the instant case points out, the reasoning
that the authority to reduce the alimony naturally implies the right to
increase the alimony would seem to be a non sequitur.
Despite the court's attempt to supply a logical basis for its decision,
it is difficult to perceive any consistency in upholding a contract as fair
and valid, stamping it with at least implied approval by incorporating it
in a decree for alimony, and then subverting the contract by awarding
alimony in excess of that agreed upon by the parties and sanctioned by
the court, while conversely allowing the contract to subvert the decree in
a case such as Goldman where the husband has acquired a reduction in
the alimony. But the decision in the present case would seem necessary
from a purely practical point of view. The plaintiff wife was in ill health,
unable to work, and destitute; she was clearly unable to support herself
on the meager award under the agreement, while the husband had met
with good fortune and enjoyed a very substantial income. But it is a
dubious standard that affords the wife relief from her contract and not
the husband.
Perhaps it is not the present case which is at fault but rather the
previous ones which do not relieve the husband of his burdens under the
contract upon a showing of need. Such considerations as the husband's
solemn duty to support his wife when able, the interest of the state in
keeping her from becoming a public charge while the husband prospers,
the blatant inequity of forcing the destitute wife, in the face of changed
and unforeseen circumstances, to remain bound by a contract made for
her support twenty years ago (especially in an economy of gradual in-
flation where the passage of time adds heavily to the unfairness of a
contract which originally seemed adequate) calls for such a decision. But
many of these same inequities are present where the husband, for just
and equitable reasons satisfactory to the court, deserves relief from the
burden of the agreement, and yet must be satisfied with an adjudication
which, while lowering the alimony award, leaves him bound to the contract.
It would seem wiser for the court to adopt a rule toward incorporation
of separation agreements by which power to regulate the amount of support
money payable by the husband would be retained in both situations.2 5
William E. Chillas
25. See Note, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 392 (1937).
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EVIDENCE - PRIOR CONVICTIONS - PENNSYLVANIA SLAYER'S ACT
BARS RE-LITIGATION OF MURDER ISSUE IN SUBSEQUENT PROBATE
PROCEEDING.
Kravitz Estate (Pa. 1965)
Claimant was tried by a jury for the murder of her husband and found
guilty of murder in the second degree.' When she later presented a claim
to her husband's residuary estate, the Orphan's Court refused to permit
the question of her guilt or innocence to be relitigated and dismissed her
claim because of her criminal conviction.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, two justices dissent-
ing, held that under the Pennsylvania Slayer's Act 2 the conviction of
murder was not merely prima facie evidence of the fact that claimant had
killed the testator but it operated as a conclusive bar to her right to take
under her husband's will. Kravitz Estate, 418 Pa. 319, 211 A.2d 443 (1965).
A litigant in a civil action who seeks by the use of a prior criminal
conviction to prove his adversary guilty of some criminal act may, first,
attempt to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and, if this fails, then
attempt to introduce the conviction into evidence for whatever weight
it may have in the forum.
Under the traditional view, collateral estoppel3 cannot be applied in
this situation because the requisite identity of parties is not present. Under
the doctrine of "mutuality of estoppel"4 the party seeking to assert collateral
estoppel must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior
action. This is not the case where a civil litigant seeks to apply a prior
criminal conviction against his adversary, because it is the State which
prosecutes the criminal action whereas the civil proceeding is maintained
by an individual.5 Moreover, since a criminal proceeding is brought to
vindicate a public right and a civil action involves only the rights of private
parties, the purposes of the litigations are different. 6 However, where the
1. Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 400 Pa. 198, 161 A.2d 861 (1960), contains a
iatmnary of the proceedings in the trial court.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3441-56 (Supp. 1964).
3. Although collateral estoppel operates within the broad concept of res judicata,
an important distinction should be observed. Whether to admit a prior conviction is
strictly a matter of estoppel rather than total res judicata since the civil proceeding
involves a different cause of action from that in the criminal one. Under total resjudicata, the prior adjudication operates as an absolute bar with regard to both the
matters offered and those that might have been offered to sustain or defeat the claim.
Under collateral estoppel, the judgment operates as an estoppel only as to matters
actually litigated and decided. See generally, Developments in the Law - Res
Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818 (1951).
4. "No party is, as a general rule, bound in a subsequent proceeding by a
judgment, unless the adverse party now seeking to secure the benefit of the former
adjudication would have been prejudiced by it if it had been determined the other
way." 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 428 (5th ed. 1925).
5. Myers v. Maryland Cas. Co., 123 Mo. App. 682, 101 S.W. 124 (1907); Mead
v. Wiley Methodist Episcopal Church, 23 N.J. Super. 342, 93 A.2d 9 (1952)
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942).
6. Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251 (1928); Seidman v.
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requirement of mutuality of estoppel has been abandoned, 7 it has been held
that the prior conviction may be asserted as a conclusive bar to recovery
in the subsequent civil proceeding.8
At common law, a judgment in a criminal case could not be intro-
duced in evidence in a civil action to prove the facts upon which it was
based. However, the number of courts which refuse to apply this general
rule is constantly growing, with the result that the decisions on this ques-
tion may be divided into three broad categories. 10
A diminishing majority of jurisdictions exclude the record of a prior
criminal proceeding - whether resulting in a conviction or an acquittal" -
as a general rule.12 Admission of the prior conviction on the issue of guilt
is said by these courts to violate the opinion rule because the criminal
judgment constitutes only the opinion of a jury.'3 These courts also
maintain that the hearsay rule is violated because the judgment is an out
of court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 14 There-
fore, many jurisdictions apply the majority rule even in situations where
the convicted criminal seeks in a civil action to reap the benefits of his
own criminal acts.15
Commentators 16 have suggested that the hearsay rule should not be a
bar to the admission of the criminal record, because it is intended primarily
to protect the right to cross-examination to determine what weight, if any,
should be given to testimony, and although the criminal record is no more
than a conclusion reached from the testimony produced at trial, the hearsay
problem is overcome since the party against whom the conviction is offered
was present at the criminal trial, was confronted by the witnesses against
him, and had the opportunity to cross-examine them. 17 The opinion rule
7. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122
P.2d 892 (1942).
8. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 615, 375 P.2d
439 (1962).
9. E.g., Silva v. Silva, 297 Mass. 217, 7 N.E.2d 601 (1937) ; Tucker v. Tucker,
101 N.J. Eq. 72, 137 At. 404 (1927) ; and see cases collected in Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d
1289 (1951); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 754 (1947) ; 2 FREMAN, JUDGMENTS § 653
(5th ed. 1925).
10. The following analysis concerns the approaches taken by the various courts
in the absence of applicable statutes. Also, it should be noted that the classifications
are primarily for the sake of convenience; decisions within a particular jurisdiction
may, and often do, fall into more than one category. See 30 FORDHAM L. Rltv.
786 (1962).
11. There is little conflict in the treatment of prior acquittal; almost all courts
exclude them in subsequent civil proceedings. The reason is that an acquittal shows
only that a reasonable doubt existed in the minds of the jurors and such evidence
has little probative value where the standard of proof is a preponderance of the
evidence. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). But see Bush, Criminal
Convictions as Evidence in Civil Proceedings, 29 Miss. L.J. 276, 278 (1958).
12. See, e.g., State v. Fitzgerald, 140 Me. 314, 37 A.2d 799 (1944) ; Jenkins v.
Jenkins, 103 Ore. 208, 204 Pac. 165 (1922).
13. MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE § 295 (1954) ; 27 ILL. L. Riv. 195, 197 (1932).
14. Ibid.
15. Goodwin v. Continental Cas. Co., 175 Okla. 469, 53 P.2d 241 (1935) ; Girard
v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 330, 154 Atd. 666 (1931).
16. MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE § 259 (1954) ; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1671 (a)
(3d ed. 1940).
17. Note, 41 HARV. L. RiV. 241, 243-44 (1927).
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objection is countered by the argument that while the conviction repre-
sents the opinion of the judge or jury, it is, nevertheless, a reliable and
trustworthy opinion formed by those acting under a duty imposed by law.' 8
Because they find these and other arguments against the majority
view persuasive, an increasing number of jurisdictions admit prior criminal
convictions, but only as prima facie evidence'9 of guilt.20 This approach
is supported by the reasoning that since a criminal conviction requires
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as against only a preponderance
of evidence needed in a civil action, it is illogical to ignore the criminal
conviction.2 ' The drafters of both the Uniform Rules of Evidence and
the Model Code of Evidence advocate the admissibility of prior criminal
convictions in a subsequent civil action.2 2 The Model Code makes all prior
convictions admissible as tending to prove the facts alleged. The Uniform
Rules distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors, maintaining the
exclusionary rule only in the case of the latter.
The rule that prior convictions are admissible has not gone without
criticism. Although the courts which admit prior criminal convictions do
not openly advocate their conclusiveness, the inherent danger of admissi-
bility is that the jury may not make such a distinction and the practical
result may be that the conviction will dominate all other evidence, so that
the opportunity to rebut the prior conviction evidence will be meaningless.
The admissibility rule has also been criticized as being at best a compro-
mise which does not completely satisfy the sometimes conflicting policy
considerations of affording a fair trial, and still preventing the relitigation
of fact issues previously determined.28
A definite minority of courts have taken the position that a criminal
conviction is conclusive in a subsequent civil proceeding. 24 The decisions,
however, indicate that the rule of conclusiveness is limited to the situation
where the plaintiff in the civil action is seeking to profit from the criminal
conduct for which he had previously been convicted.25 These courts are
18. Ibid.
19. By this is meant evidence "which suffices for the proof of a particular fact
until contradicted and overcome by other evidence." Dodson v. Watson, 110 Tex. 355,
358, 220 S.W. 771, 772 (1920).
20. E.g., Rosenberger v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 176 F. Supp. 379(D. Kan. 1959) ; United States ex rel. Valenti v. Karmuth, 1 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.Y.
1932) ; Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932). See 3 JONES,
EVIDENCE § 639 (1958).
21. Ibid.
22. MODEL CODE op EVIDENCE rule 521 (1942) ; UNIFORM RULE op EVIDENCE
63 (20).
23. See 50 YALE L.J. 499, 502 (1941).
24. The rule giving conclusive effect to the prior conviction is limited to a finaljudgment on the merits and is rarely applied to convictions of minor traffic offenses
and other misdemeanors. The latter are excluded because the safeguards afforded
the accused are often perfunctory, and defendants tend to accept a modest fine as a
matter of convenience. See, e.g., Day v. Gold Star Dairy, 307 Mich. 383, 12 N.W.2d 5(1943) ; Walther v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div. 169, 93 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1949).
25. E.g., Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140
S.E. 314 (1927) (prior conviction of burning the insured property held conclusive in
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primarily influenced by the clear injustice and defiance of public policy
which would result from allowing a criminal to benefit from his own
wrongful act.2 6 In 1956, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania indicated its
approval of this approach when it held, in Mineo v. Eureka Security Fire
& Marine Ins. Co.,27 that the named insured in a fire insurance policy
was conclusively barred from recovery under the policy by his prior con-
viction for arson. In accord is a later decision in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the conviction of the person bonded was con-
clusive as to the surety's liability for the amount of the bonds.28 How-
ever, in the latter case there was a basis for the application of res judicata
since the Commonwealth was, in effect, the litigating party in both actions,
and thus the case may be consistent with the common law rule. In the
recent case of Hurtt v. Stirone,29 the Pennsylvania court further departed
from the majority rule by extending conclusive effect to a previous federal
criminal conviction. Prior to the above cases, Pennsylvania decisions had
been in conformity with the majority rule that a criminal conviction is not
admissible in a subsequent civil suit involving the same facts.30
In the absence of the Slayer's Act, the instant case could have easily
been disposed of on the basis of these prior decisions. The applicability
of that statute, however, injected an element of complexity into the case.
The Slayer's Act3' provides that "no slayer shall in any way acquire any
property or receive any benefit as a result of the death of the decedent .... ,,32
Section 14 of the statute specifies that "the record of his conviction of
having participated in the willful and unlawful killing of the decedent shall
be admissible in evidence against a claimant of property in any civil action
arising under this act."13 3 It seems apparent from the statutory language
that the legislature intended to adopt the compromise view,3 4 that is, to
make such convictions admissible as prima facie evidence in the situation
where a person is attempting to profit by his own wrong.3 5
26. See Austin v. United States, 125 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1942) (conviction of
murder admitted to estop claimant from recovering as beneficiary of life insurance
policy).
27. 182 Pa. Super. 75, 125 A.2d 612 (1956) ; cf., Greifer's Estate, 333 Pa. 278,
5 A.2d 118 (1939).
28. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 412 Pa.
222, 194 A.2d 423 (1963).
29. 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965). See 26 U. Pir. L. Rgv. 873 (1965).
30. See, e.g., Nowak v. Orange, 349 Pa. 217, 36 A.2d 781 (1944) ; Wingrove v.
Central Pennsylvania Tractor Co., 237 Pa. 549, 85 Atd. 850 (1912).
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3441-56 (Supp. 1964). A "slayer" is defined in
section 1 of the Act as "any person who participates, either as a principal or as an
accessory before the fact, in the willful and unlawful killing of any other person."
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3442 (Supp. 1964).
33. Emphasis added.
34. See notes 16-23 supra.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3455 (Supp. 1964) provides: "This act shall not
be considered penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to effect the
policy of this State that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong,
wherever committed." Although this language initially seems to support the majority's
position (and the court in fact relies upon it), it must be remembered that, as pointed
out above, Pennsylvania followed the common law rule on admissibility of prior
WINTER 1966]
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It is important to recognize that at the time the legislature enacted
this law, the decisions in Pennsylvania adhered to the view that prior
criminal convictions were inadmissible.36 It appears, therefore, that the
legislature intended to apply a special rule in a specific situation for reasons
of public policy. Also significant is the fact that the legislature chose to
adopt, almost in full, the statute proposed by Professor Wade.3 7 In fact,
section 14 of the Pennsylvania Statute, is identical to the section 14
which he proposed. In commenting upon his proposal, he says:
This section is purely optional, and may be included or omitted as
the particular state may desire. In the absence of this section the vast
majority of the states would hold that the record of a conviction in
a criminal prosecution is not admissible in a civil action to prove the
guilt or innocence of the person tried. . . . Some states may even
wish to make a conviction conclusive evidence of the guilt of the
alleged slayer.38
The lower courts in Pennsylvania have consistently construed the
statute to provide for admissibility only.3 9 But the Supreme Court is
apparently willing to extend its rejection of the common law rule even
into an area in which the legislature has clearly spoken. Such a per-
version of statutory language does not seem necessary. The majority
maintain that to interpret the Slayer's Act otherwise and allow the con-
victed slayer to relitigate the issue of guilt would make a mockery of law
and justice. 40 This argument appears to emanate from the fear that an
inconsistent decision might be reached in a subsequent civil trial. How-
ever, it is inherent in the concept of the jury system that different juries
do act inconsistently and that a jury may err in its findings. It is not
unusual to have a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and appellate
courts continually study and dissect jury determinations which are con-
tested as being unwarranted. It can also be argued that, rather than
destroying confidence in the jury system, 41 relitigation of an issue decided
in a prior criminal case would only bolster faith in the judicial process and
insure that parties establish the allegations of their pleadings by a pre-
ponderance of independent evidence. 42
Holding a prior criminal conviction to be conclusive evidence also
makes automatic the imposition of an additional penalty not prescribed for
the criminal act. Public policy demands that a person be precluded from
profiting by his own wrong, but in a civil trial where the commission of
convictions at the time the statute was passed. It would seem that the legislators
merely intended to emphasize to the courts that, in this particular area, the common
law rule should not be followed.
36. See note 30 supra.
37. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another - A Statutory
Solution, 49 HARV. L. Rgv. 715 (1936).
38. Id. at 750. (Emphasis added.)
39. D'Amore's Estate, 37 Del. Co. 360 (1950); Pinder's Estate, 36 Del. Co.
191 (1947).
40. 418 Pa. 319, 322, 211 A.2d 443, 448 (1965).
41. Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493, 498, 206 A.2d 624, 626 (1965).
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that wrong is relevant, it should be proved without unfair prejudice and
according to the rules of evidence. It is no hardship to require civil litigants
to conduct their case in the usual manner, without allowing one party a
"windfall" from an action prosecuted by the state.
Whether to allow a prior criminal conviction to be conclusive evidence
in a subsequent civil action is a question which, in its essence, reflects the
conflict between traditional rules of law and pragmatic policy considera-
tions. A balance between economy of judicial action and a strict view of
the principles of evidence may be achieved by allowing the prior conviction
the limited effect of prima facie evidence. The latter approach was adopted
by the Pennsylvania legislature.
Martin G. McGuinn, Jr.
FEDERAL COURTS - REVIEW OF COURTS-MARTIAL - DISTRICT
COURT LACKS JURISDICTION IN DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION
ALLEGING VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY A COURT-
MARTIAL.
Ashe v. McNamara (D. Mass. 1965)
The present plaintiff and two co-defendants were tried by a general
court-martial in 1945 for the offense of striking a fellow member of the
United States Navy. Although a discrepancy developed during trial
between the testimony of the present petitioner and that of one of his
co-defendants, counsel was nevertheless directed to proceed with the defense
of all three men. Plaintiff was convicted and, after unsuccessfully exhaust-
ing his administrative remedies, was dishonorably discharged.
Some twenty years later he instituted the present action in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking a declara-
tory judgment' that his conviction and sentence were invalid, and a
mandatory injunction2 to compel the Secretary of Defense to remove his
dishonorable discharge.
1. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201-02 (1958), as amended, 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. V, 1964) provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of
the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be sought.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp. V, 1962) provides: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer
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Defendant thereupon moved for a summary judgment, which the court
granted, holding that the determination of a court-martial is not subject
to review by a civil court in an action for a declaratory judgment, even
though plaintiff may have been denied the right to counsel. Ashe v.
McNamara, 243 F. Supp. 243 (D. Mass. 1965).
Traditionally, the federal courts have been precluded from direct
review of courts-martial determinations by a number of judicial3 and
statutory4 prohibitions founded largely upon practical considerations of
expediency and discipline.5 Thus, prior to the last several decades military
convictions, when finally approved, were as conclusive as those of a civil
court of last resort.6
However, notwithstanding these prohibitions, the civil courts, by taking
cognizance of the fact that courts-martial were tribunals of limited jurisdic-
tion, subsequently subjected them to collateral review on the issue of
jurisdiction.7 At first, such inquiries were limited to determinations of
whether the tribunal had been properly convened and constituted ;8 whether
it had jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the offense charged ;10
and whether it had authority to impose the sentence, and had done so in
the manner prescribed by law." It thus became clear that the scope of
collateral review was limited specifically to a consideration of what Mr.
Justice Black has characterized as jurisdiction in the "historical sense. ' ' 1 2
Mere factual error or procedural irregularity committed in the course of
3. E.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946); In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126
(1900); Ex parte Valladingham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 243 (1863) ; Dynes v. Hoover,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
4. 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1958), as amended (Supp. V, 1964), which reads in perti-
nent part: ". . . all dismissals and discharges carried into execution under sentence
by courts-martial following approval, review, or affirmation as required by this chapter
are final and conclusive .. .and all action taken pursuant to those proceedings are
binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States ... "
Earlier provisions of finality concerning court-martial judgments under the
former Articles of War were found in article 50, formerly § 1521 of Title 10, Army
and Air Force (June 4, 1920) ch. 227, subch. II, § 1, 41 Stat. 797; June 24, 1948, ch.
625, Title II, § 226, 62 Stat. 635.
5. See Dynes v. Hoover, supra note 3, at 65-67, where the Court noted that
otherwise the civil courts would virtually administer the Articles of War irrespective
of those to whom that duty has been delegated by the laws of the United States.
6. See cases cited at note 3 supra.
7. E.g., In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150 (1890) ; Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S.
13 (1879).
8. E.g., United States v. Smith, 197 U.S. 386 (1905) ; McClaughry v. Deming,
186 U.S. 49 (1902).
9. E.g., Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879) ; United States ex rel. Viscardi v.
MacDonald, 265 Fed. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1920).
10. E.g., Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886) ; Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 65, 66 (1858).
11. E.g., Bishop v. United States, 197 U.S. 334 (1905) ; Carter v. Roberts, 177
U.S. 496 (1900) ; Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897) ; Ex parte Mason,
105 U.S. 696 (1881).
12. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 152 (1953) (dissenting opinion), rehearing
denied, 346 U.S. 844, 848 (1953) (separate opinion) ; See Pasley, The Federal Courts
Look at the Court-Martial, 12 U. PiTr. L. Rsv. 7, 34 (1950) ; Duke & Vogel, The
Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-Martial Jurisdiction,
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an otherwise lawful proceeding were considered beyond the purview of
the courts.'8
However, the juxtaposition of two significant developments has shaken
the unanimity among the federal courts concerning the scope of this col-
lateral review.14
The first was the general expansion of collateral review in proceedings
for habeas corpus with respect to non-military criminal convictions. 15 Prior
to the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst,"6
the extent of collateral review facilitated by habeas corpus was equally
narrow in both military and civil cases: both were limited to considerations
of technical jurisdiction? 7 In Zerbst however, the Court extended the
the term "jurisdiction" beyond its purely technical denotation, holding
that error in the course of a trial which results in a violation of an
accused's constitutional guarantees would act to deprive the court of juris-
diction.18  This theory was subsequently expanded to afford relief even
where the alleged denial of constitutional rights was raised at trial and
the issue decided adversely to the defendant, provided it could be demon-
strated that the lower court had erred with respect to such finding.19
The second notable development was the mobilization of enormous
citizen armies during World War II. As a result, large numbers of men
imprisoned or burdened with dishonorable discharges petitioned the courts,
seeking relief on the various constitutional grounds previously available
only to their civilian counterparts.2 0 In many of these cases, petitioners
were unable to meet the orthodox grounds of collateral review; for, as a
rule, the courts-martial had met the technical tests of jurisdiction. Often,
however, the hard facts of a particular case caused the courts to reject the
traditional restrictions on collateral review. 21
13. The Supreme Court has held that a civil court, in exercising collateral review
over a court-martial, does not exercise power to correct factual error or procedural
irregularity. Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922) ; In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147,
150 (1890) ; Keyes v. United States, 109 U.S. 336 (1883).
14. See Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-
Martial Convictions, 61 COLUM. L. Rxv. 40, 43-48 (1961) - compare Anthony v.
Hunter, 71 F. Supp. 823 (D. Kan. 1947), with Arnold v. Cozart, 75 F. Supp. 47(N.D. Tex. 1948).
15. See Duke & Vogel, supra note 12, at 438 n.17 and accompanying text.
16. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See Duke & Vogel, supra note 12.
17. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844, 846 (1953)
(separate opinion).
18. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
19. E.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556-57 (1954) ; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S.
101, 104-05 (1942).
20. See Bishop, supra note 14, at 43-48. Professor Bishop notes that
... it was inevitable, given the frequently amateur personnel of wartime courts-
martial, . . . that some of the petitioners could tell startling, and sometimes
apparently truthful, tales of unfairness, calculated to cause a federal judge of
average fairmindedness to chafe under the restrictions of the traditional rules and
make him receptive to the heterodox proposition that even soldiers were entitled
to some sort of due process, whether by virtue of the Constitution or the Articles
of War, the denial of which could cause a court-martial to lose the jurisdiction
that it would otherwise have had.
Id. at 45.
21. Ibid; accord, Beets v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 825 (D. Kan. 1948) ; Shapiro v.
United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 650, 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947).
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Thus, in Shapiro v. United States,2 2 the Court of Claims applied
Zerbst to invalidate a conviction by an otherwise lawfully constituted court-
martial. The court reasoned that the tribunal had lost jurisdiction to
proceed when it deprived the accused of his right to counsel, and had thus
failed to "complete the court - as the Sixth Amendment required .... 23
While the Court of Claims has adhered to this position in subsequent
decisions, 24 other federal courts have instead turned to the concept of
"military due process" as a means of expanding the scope of review over
court-martial determinations. 25
In United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt,26 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, while recognizing that military and civil due process were not
totally synonomous, nevertheless held that the "basic standard of fairness"
afforded by the due process clause of the fifth amendment applied to a military
defendant as well as to an accused in a non-military criminal proceeding.27
Similarly, in the case of Hicks v. Hiatt,28 where petitioner had been
convicted by a general court-martial on a charge of rape, the court found
the "totality of error" committed by the court martial so extensive as
to have deprived petitioner of his right to a fair trial. The court concluded
that it had jurisdiction to review the proceeding inasmuch as the "pro-
cedures of military law . . . [had not been] . . . applied to Hicks in a
fundamentally fair way." 29 These courts have never considered the applica-
bility of Zerbst to the military defendant, but rather have adopted the
view that in habeas corpus proceedings the scope of collateral review is
extended to include the question of military due process as though the
court were reviewing the action of a statutory agency.30
Despite the growing dissatisfaction among the lower federal judiciary
with the traditional scope of collateral review, the Supreme Court, in Hiatt
v. Brown,3 1 rejected this approach, summarily declaring that collateral
review was a strictly limited function that should not be extended to
consideration of a court-martial's compliance with the due process clause.
The Court noted that the correction of errors affecting military due process
was statutorily reserved to the military authorities. 32
22. Shapiro v. United States, supra note 21.
23. Id. at 207-08.
24. Begalke v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 55, 55-57, 286 F.2d 606, 606-08 (1960)
Sima v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 405, 406, 96 F. Supp. 932 (1951) but see, Fly v.
United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 482, 498, 100 F. Supp. 440 (1951).
25. E.g., Benjamin v. Hunter, 169 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1948) ; Beets v. Hunter,
75 F. Supp. 825 (1948); Re Wrublewski, 71 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Cal. 1947), aff'd,
166 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1948). But see Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316
(D. Utah 1965).
26. 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944).
27. Id. at 666.
28. 64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1946) (dicta). It should be noted that the habeas
corpus proceeding was dismissed by the court after the War Department Restorations
Section vacated the discharge and ordered petitioner's release. See Pasley, snpra
note 12.
29. Hicks v. Hiatt, supra note 28, at 249-50.
30. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 846 (1953) (separate opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter).
31. 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
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However, in the subsequent decision of Burns v. Wilson,33 the Court,
although recognizing that district courts did not have jurisdiction to review
a military court's alleged violation of due process, stated that:
It is the . . .function of the civil courts to determine whether the
military have given fair consideration to each of these claims [of
deprivation of basic constitutional rights]. . . . [But had] the military
courts manifestly refused to consider those claims, the District Court
was empowered to review them de novo.
3 4
An examination of Burns indicates that the Court has given little
consideration to the degree of protection afforded the military defendant
by the Bill of Rights. In addition, subsequent lower court decisions have
indicated that the issue of basic fairness remains unresolved. But while the
Court has been unable to provide clear direction in defining the federal
courts' jurisdiction to review questions of military due process, it should
be noted that it has yet to be presented with the applicability of Johnson
v. Zerbst and its extension to the area of military law. 5
In the instant case, plaintiff submitted that his conviction and dis-
honorable discharge by a general court-martial in violation of his consti-
tutional right to counsel constituted a serious and continuing injury-" from
which the federal courts were empowered to grant declaratory and injunc-
tive relief. In rejecting this contention, the court ruled that an action for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief was inappropriate in light of the
provision in the Uniform Code of Military Justice that judgments and
sentences of courts-martial are "final and conclusive. 37
Inasmuch as these restrictions do not constitute a bar to collateral
review, it would appear that the court assumed petitioner's cause of action
constituted a direct, rather than collateral, attack on his conviction. In
order to analyze the court's disposition of the petitioner's cause of action,
it is therefore necessary to focus on whether declaratory and injunctive
relief are proper vehicles for collateral review.
Traditionally, questions concerning the sufficiency of a military tri-
bunal's jurisdiction have been open to review by the civil courts in suits
to recover compensation, 8 on writs of prohibition, 39 and most often on
33. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
34. Id. at 142. In Burns, the Court indicated that in certain limited instances it
would be proper for civilian courts, in habeas corpus proceedings, to determine whether
a military tribunal had given full consideration to objections raised by the defendant
on due process grounds. The impact of this dictum is uncertain. See Note, 65 YALE
L.J. 412, 421-22 n.48 (1956).
35. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844 (1953) (separate opinion by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter). See Note, 67 HARV. L. REV. 479, 484 n.44 (1954).
36. For an indication of the continuing impact of the "less than honorable" dis-
charge, see Dougherty & Lynch, The Administrative Discharge: Military Justice?,
33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 498, 501 (1964).
37. See note 4, supra. But see Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953), where
the Supreme Court referred to the provision and said: "We have held before that
this does not displace the civil courts' jurisdiction over an application for habeas
corpus." Accord, Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 144 (1946).
38. E.g., Begalke v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 55, 286 F.2d 606 (1960) ; Shapiro
v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 650, 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947) ; Swaim v. United States
165 U.S. 553 (1897). However, in the instant case a suit for compensation was barred
by the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1958).
39. E.g., Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1885). In the instant case the court-
martial had already acted. Today, such attacks are permitted only after the petitioner
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writs of habeas corpus.40 However, as these forms of action were no longer
available,41 the plaintiff was forced to seek declaratory and injunctive relief
pursuant to the Judicial Code.
The method of review chosen by the plaintiff is directly supported by
Jackson v. McElroy,42 where it was held, on the basis of the Supreme
Court's decision in Harmon v. Brucker,43 that a district court is empowered
to question the jurisdiction of a court-martial in an action for declaratory
judgment. In Harmon, the Court upheld the district court's jurisdiction,
not only on the grounds that the Secretary of Defense had acted in excess
of his statutory authority by issuing administrative "less than honorable"
discharges, but also on the theory that the injuries suffered by the peti-
tioners were sufficient to give them standing to bring the action.44  It
should be noted, however, that while those who receive less than honor-
able discharges are subjected to continuing economic and social discrimina-
tion,45 courts-martial are not administrative bodies whose judgments are
subject to attack on the same basis as those of governmental agencies.
Rather, they are tribunals created for the performance of a purely judicial
function, and discharges issued pursuant to their sentences are open to
review only upon the issue of jurisdiction.46
Thus, the significance of Harmon to the instant case and to Jackson
does not lie with its determination that a court's jurisdiction may depend
in part on the existence of the plaintiff's injury. To the contrary, the court
in Jackson recognized that its jurisdiction to collaterally review a court-
martial conviction was based upon the existence of a genuine issue as to
the tribunal's jurisdiction. That court merely relied upon Harmon to
establish that declaratory and injunctive relief were proper forms of action
to review a tribunal's jurisdiction when other methods of review were no
longer available.
has exhausted all available administrative remedies. See Gusik v. Schilder, 340
U.S. 128 (1950).
40. Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965) ; Beets v. Hunter,
75 F. Supp. 825 (D. Kan. 1948) ; Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1946).
Habeas corpus was no longer available to question the validity of the petitioner's
imprisonment as he was no longer incarcerated. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241, chs. 1-5 (1958),
as amended (Supp. V, 1964).
41. See notes 38-40 supra.
42. 163 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1958).
43. 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
44. Begalke v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 55, 55-58, 286 F.2d 606, 606-09 n.8
(1960). The federal courts have been as reluctant to review administrative discharges
as those issued pursuant to court-martial convictions. See 41 Stat. § 809 (1920), as
amended, 10 U.S.C. § 652(a) (1952), now codified in 10 U.S.C. § 3811 (1958), as
amended (Supp. V, 1964). The Harmon decision, like that in Burns v. Wilson, serves
as a caution against applying provisions of "finality" in legislation as though they
were absolute prohibitions. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953), rehearing
denied, 346 U.S. 844, 850 (1953) (separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
45. See Dougherty & Lynch, supra note 36, at 498-528.
46. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953); Swaim v. United States, 165
U.S. 553 (1897) ; Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 557 (1877). See generally
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The instant court rejected the Jackson decision, reasoning that the
Supreme Court in Harmon had given no indication of an intent to expand
the district courts' "review" over military judgments. The court also dis-
tinguished Harmon on its facts, since it did not concern the judgment of
a military court, which by statute is final and binding.
It is submitted that this determination failed to address itself to the
issue, since the Jackson court did not rely upon Harmon to extend its
jurisdiction over a controversy where previously none had existed; rather
it saw this decision as an indication that the Court considered an action
for declaratory judgment as an acceptable method of collateral review.
Inasmuch as the finality restrictions relied upon by the court do not
constitute a bar to collateral review, it would appear the court assumed
an action for declaratory judgment constituted a direct, rather than col-
lateral, attack on the petitioner's conviction. Such an assumption is in
conflict with Harmon and other decisions where courts which were strictly
limited to collateral review have been permitted to entertain actions for
declaratory judgment.47
Having seemingly misconstrued the import of the Jackson and Harmon
decisions, the instant court failed to consider the real issues presented by
the plaintiff's allegations - whether he, as a member of the military estab-
lishment, had a constitutional right to counsel; and, if so, whether depriva-
tion of this right by a military tribunal would result in its loss of jurisdic-
tion. With respect to the first consideration, the Supreme Court, in Reid
v. Covert,48 has indicated that, "it has not been clearly settled to what
extent the Bill of Rights and other protective parts of the Constitution apply
to military trials. '49 Yet while it is clear that certain constitutional guar-
antees do not extend to military personnel, 50 the right to effective assistance
of counsel has been generally recognized as applicable to those in the military
services, and the language of several decisions is in accord with this view.51
47. Even where a statutory form of action is exclusive, an injunction or declara-
tory relief has been permitted as a means of collateral review when other methods
were unavailable. E.g., Leedom v. International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter
Workers, 352 U.S. 145 (1956). See Dunmar v. Ailes, 230 F. Supp. 87 (D.D.C. 1964),
which was relied upon by the present petitioner.
48. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
49. Id. at 37. It is difficult to determine whether the courts were denying the
applicability of constitutional guarantees to courts-martial, or were merely refusing
to expand habeas corpus review to constitutional questions in general. See Note,
47 G~o. L.J. 185, 187 (1958) ; Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 874 (1957).
50. The Constitution itself does not exempt courts-martial or actions of Congress
and the President in their regulation of the military from any of the requirements of
the Bill of Rights other than those of jury trial and grand jury indictment, U.S.
CONST. amend. V.; the authority to regulate the military, like other constitutional
powers, would appear to be limited by the fundamental guarantees of individual rights
contained in the constitution. See Note, 65 YALE L.J. 413, 421-22 n.48; United States
v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 531, 16 C.M.R. 83, 105 (1954) (dictum), where the
Court of Military Appeals indicated that constitutional guarantees are available to
military defendants; accord, United States v. Langer, 20 C.M.R. 513, 516-17 (Nay.
Bd. of Review) (1955) (dictum).
51. See cases cited at note 50 supra; see also Beets v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 825(D. Kan. 1948) ; Shapiro v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 650, 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947) ;
but see, Ex parte Benton, 63 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Cal. 1945). See generally Note,
67 HARV. L. Rrv. 479, 483 (1954) ; Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 413 (1956). See also
Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965), a decision rendered subse-
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The second, and more novel consideration, involves the question of
whether the violation of a military defendant's constitutional rights would
result in loss of the court-martial's jurisdiction under the same rationale
which the Supreme Court has adopted with respect to non-military criminal
trials, and which the Court of Claims has consistently applied to the area
of military law. 52 It should be noted that while the Supreme Court has
sharply curtailed consideration of military due process in the lower federal
courts, it has never been called upon to determine whether the rule
enunciated in Zerbst extends to violations of a military defendant's con-
stitutional rights.53
In the words of Justice Frankfurter it would appear that:
• . . if denial of the right to counsel makes a civil body legally non-
existent, i.e., 'without jurisdiction', . . . by what process of reasoning
can a military body denying such right to counsel fail to be equally
nonexistent. .... 54
While petitioner did not directly refer to the Zerbst doctrine, the court,
by failing to focus upon the court-martial's jurisdiction as the critical issue,
was precluded from any consideration of the applicability of Zerbst which
could have been raised by its own observation of the Shapiro decision.
It is submitted that a military defendant is entitled to the right to
counsel, and that there is neither constitutional nor historical justification
to hold that such right is not constitutionally protected. Nor is there reason
to hold that, if denial of this right by a civil court would act to extinguish
its jurisdiction, the same result would not follow with respect to a military
court.5 5 It is clear that the instant court ignored these critical considera-
tions by disposing of the petitioner's cause of action solely on the ground
that declaratory and injunctive relief are, in and of themselves, forms of
direct attack, notwithstanding the collateral nature of the jurisdictional
issue to be determined.
It is therefore submitted that the court's disposition of the case was
erroneous. The critical factor in determining whether the review in ques-
tion was collateral (and thus permissible) or direct (and thus prohibited)
is the jurisdiction of the tribunal whose judgment is being attacked, and
not the form of action by which it is being questioned.
William E. Iorio
quent to the instant case, which held that "the Sixth Amendment . . . applies to
proceedings before special courts-martial in the military service as far as [it] concerns
the right to the assistance of counsel. ... Id. at 320.
52. See notes 24-25 supra, and accompanying text.
53. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 848 (separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter).
54. Id. at 848.
55. Application of Stapley, 346 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965), a decision rendered
subsequent to the instant case which held: "That by reason of the violation of the
petitioner's constitutional rights the special court-martial acted without jurisdic-
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - IMPOSTERS - UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 3-405 IMPOSES Loss ON DRAWER INDUCED TO WRITE
CHECK BY INNOCENT THIRD PARTY WHO HAS BEEN DUPED BY
IMPOSTER.
Philadelphia Title Ins. Co. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co.
(Pa. 1965)
An imposter, posing as the sole heir to certain real estate in Phila-
delphia, successfully deceived a real estate broker into obtaining a party
who would lend money in return for a mortgage on the property.1 The
mortgagee requested the plaintiff to insure the title to the mortgaged
property, and on the day of settlement, in the presence of the real estate
broker and the imposter's accomplice, remitted the full amount of the loan
to the plaintiff with the intention that the money be passed on to the real
owner of the property, who was thought to be the mortgagor. Plaintiff
drew a check on its own bank, the defendant, for the full amount of the
loan and named the real owner as the payee. The accomplice, who was
actually the estranged wife of the real owner, accepted delivery of the
check, and gave it to the imposter who had not been present at the settle-
ment. The latter then forged the payee's indorsement. The fraud was
discovered long after the imposter had received the proceeds of the check,
and, after reimbursing the mortgagee for his loss and setting the mortgage
aside, plaintiff sued the drawee bank and all the other banks in the collec-
tion process for honoring the forged indorsement of the payee's name.
After judgment was given to the plaintiff in the lower court, the defendants
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which reversed, holding that
as between the drawer of the check and the payor bank, the former would
have to bear the loss under section 3-405 of the Uniform Commercial Code
because that section shifts the loss to the drawer in cases where the im-
poster induces the drawer to issue the check, even though third parties,
who were the actual victims of the imposture, provided the direct induce-
ment for the issuance of the check.2 Philadelphia Title Ins. Co. v. Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Co., 419 Pa. 78, 222 A.2d 212 (1965).
In the classic imposter situation two persons are deceived: the drawer,
maker or indorser who is induced by the fraud of the imposter to draw or
indorse the instrument to someone whom he thought was a real payee or
indorsee, and the party who accepts the imposter's forged indorsement
1. The estranged wife of the administrator and sole heir of an estate which
included certain real estate appeared without her husband's knowledge at the office
of a real estate broker with the imposter whom she introduced as her husband. The
imposter signed the husband's name to a deed conveying the real estate to the wife
and her husband as tenants by the entireties and also signed the husband's name to a
mortgage and bond.
2. The court stated that it was unnecessary to decide whether the title company's
clerk, who drew the check, was negligent, because section 3-405, which is not based
on a standard of care, precludes the title company from recovering.
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and subsequently pays out on the instrument.' In a typical situation the
imposter will pose as the party to whom the drawer is induced to draw
the instrument. The drawer will deliver it to the imposter who then again
poses as the payee when he indorses the instrument over to a holder in
due course or a depositary bank. The crucial question is which of the
deceived parties should bear the loss: the drawer who allowed himself to
be duped by the imposter into drawing and delivering the check or the party
who accepted the paper under a forged indorsement.4 At common law the
loss was oftentimes charged to the drawer who had started the sequence of
events by allowing the imposter to induce him to write the instrument. 5
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.) did not explicitly
deal with the problem of the imposter, but courts nevertheless attempted
to use certain of its provisions to solve the difficulty of allocating the loss
which resulted from the fraud. In many cases, the named payee was a
non-existent person, but section 9(3)6 of the N.I.L., which made all paper
drawn to the order of a fictitious payee bearer paper which could be
properly indorsed by anyone, including the imposter, was inapplicable
because it required that the drawer know he was drawing a check in favor
of a fictitious payee. 7 Section 238 provided that when a signature was
forged or made without the authority of the party whose name was signed,
it could not confer on a subsequent taker under the indorsement a right
to the instrument. This rule would appear to impose the loss on depositary
banks which accepted for deposit or immediate credit checks bearing
forged indorsements.
To circumvent section 23 in imposter cases, courts used the fiction of
dominant intent to shift the loss back to the drawer. Under this theory,
it was said that the drawer had two intentions when he drew the check,
namely, to pay the person actually standing before him and to pay the
name whom he purported to be.9 The first intent was said to be the
dominant one, and therefore, in a situation where the imposter was
physically present before the drawer, he became the party to whom the
paper was intended to be made payable. Thus, the depositary bank merely
carried out the drawer's order by paying out on the imposter's indorse-
ment. This fiction worked well when the imposter stood before the
drawer and induced him to write the check, but the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in Russel v. Second Nat'l Bank,10 ruled that the dominant intent
was missing when the imposter induced the drawer by mail to draw the
check to the order of a named payee and then forged the payee's name
in the indorsement.
3. Abel, The Imposter Payee: Or, Rhode Island Was Right: I, 1940 Wis. L.
Rtv. 161, 162.
4. Ibid.
5. Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liab. Ins. Co., 94' N.J.L. 152,
109 Atd. 296 (1920).
6. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLIS INSTRUMENTS LAW § 9(3).
7. See 33 ST. JoHN's L. Rev. 105, 107 (1958).
8. UNIFORM NuGOTIABLt INSTRUMPNTS LAW § 23.
9. See 18 U. CHi. L. R.v. 281, 285 (1951).
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The language of section 23 could also be used to avoid placing the
loss on the depositary bank without resorting to the dominant intent fiction.
That section contained a caveat that in certain unspecified instances a
party would be precluded from setting up forgery as a defense to an in-
strument on which he was otherwise liable. In Montgomery Garage Co.
v. Manufacturer's Liab. Ins. Co." it was held that the imposter situation
was one of those instances, and that the drawer was therefore precluded
from showing that the indorsement on the check was a forgery.' 2
Some courts, however, refused to shift the loss to the drawer. In
Tolman v. American Nat'l Bank'" the court held that the fact that the
drawer had been imposed upon did not release the payor bank from its
duty to see that the money was paid according to order. In Cohen v.
Lincoln Sav. Bank14 an attorney had persuaded the drawer to pay to a
person who said his name was Wolter $4500 in return for an assignment
of rights to a condemnation award. Neither the attorney nor the drawer
had had any previous dealings with Wolter. Wolter's imposter took de-
livery of the check and sold it to the defendant. The court refused to
place the loss on the drawer, holding that "only a payee named in the
instrument or identified by previous dealings and intended to be described
by that name can transfer title to the instrument."' 5 Thus, the New York
courts would only follow the dominant intent rule where the imposter
had been physically present and had been involved in the transactions which
led to the drawing of the check.
In Land-Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank'( the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court expressed its approval of the dominant intent fiction,
but refused to hold the drawer responsible because the imposter, claiming
to be an agent of the payee, had induced the drawer to pay to the order
of a named party. Here the court reasoned that the drawer intended to
pay only the name written on the instrument. There could be no dominant
intent to pay the party standing before him as that person was a mere agent.
Therefore, the paper could be negotiated only on the payee's genuine
indorsement. Section 3-405 (1) (a) of the Uniform Commercial Code,"
under which the present case was decided, expressly provides for the
imposter situation:
An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is
effective if
11. 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 Atl. 296 (1920).
12. Another approach to the problem has been to use a negligence test to deter-
mine which victim was more at fault. However, this test has not been generally
accepted, because it is felt that common law negligence rules should not be applied
to negotiable instruments which are rooted in the law merchant. See 33 ST. JOHN'S
L. Rev. 105, 109 (1958).
13. 22 R.I. 462, 48 Atl. 480 (1901).
14. 275 N.Y. 399, 10 N.E.2d 457 (1937).
15. Id. at 412, 10 N.E.2d at 463.
16. 196 Pa. 230, 46 Atl. 420 (1900).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-405(1) (a) (Supp. 1964).
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(a) an imposter by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the
maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his con-
federate in the name of the payee... J8
The comment to this section indicates that it overrules those cases,
such as Russel, which considered pivotal the question whether the im-
posture was perpetrated face-to-face or by mail. The dominant intent
theory is dismissed as a useless fiction. The purpose of the new section is
to place the loss, "regardless of the type of fraud which the particular
imposter has committed," on the maker or drawer. Section 3-40419 retains
the N.I.L. rule that parties who take an order instrument under the payee's
forged indorsement can acquire no title to it.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the present case, relied on no
cases under the N.I.L. to arrive at its decision; instead, it pointed to the
official comment to buttress its argument.20 Plaintiff argued that section
3-405(1) (a) was inapplicable in this situation because it was induced to
draw the check by the mortgagee, who had applied for title insurance on
the mortgage, not the imposter. The court, however, ruled for the defen-
dant under the rationale that there is no difference between the drawer
who is defrauded by an imposter dealing directly through the mails and
one duped by an imposter working through the medium of third parties;
loss resulting from both methods of imposture would fall on the drawer.
The court stated that the words "or otherwise" were intended to provide
for those situations where the inducement was made by means other than
face-to-face or by mail. Section 3-405, said the court, was intended to cover
all ". . . the ingenious schemes designed and carried out by imposters for the
purpose of defrauding the makers and drawers of negotiable instruments."12 1
It is submitted that the court stretched the meaning of section
3-405 (1) (a) beyond what was intended by the drafters. Although that
section rejects the distinction between impostures carried out face-to-face
and those perpetrated "by mail or otherwise," the rule that the imposter
must induce the drawer to issue the instrument is apparently retained.
Although it is true that by inducing an innocent third party to persuade
the drawer to issue the instrument, the imposter is the initiating cause of
a chain of events which finally results in delivery of the check to his agent
or himself; the inducement which actually brought to bear on the drawer
is the request of the third party. Causing a party to act is not always the
same thing as inducing or persuading him to do so. The court, by interpret-
ing the words "or otherwise" to cover situations where there is imposture
18. Ibid.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-404 (Supp. 1964).
20. The majority opinion stated that no case had been found which decided how
the N.I.L. would have covered this particular fact situation. But cf. Land Title Bank
& Trust Co. v. Cheltenham Nat'l Bank, 362 Pa. 30, 66 A.2d 768 (1949), where on
similar facts it was held that when the person who received the check from the drawer
and committed the forgery of the indorsement was not intended by the drawer to be
the payee, the loss would fall on the party who accepted the forged indorsement. See
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Mellon Nat'l Bank, 276 Pa. 212, 119 Atd. 910 (1923).
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through third parties is really saying that inducement is equivalent to cause,
and that therefore, whenever the imposter is a cause of the instrument's
issuance, the imposter rule will apply. The difficulty with such an inter-
pretation is that the court formulated no guidelines as to how remote the
imposture could be in relation to the drawer in order still to be considered
a cause bringing the case within the purvue of 3-405 (1) (a). Since causation
is a fact question, this will lead to unpredictable results in future imposter
cases, a situation that the drafters of the code were trying to prevent by
abolishing the dominant intent fiction.
It is true that the drafters sought to place on the drawer any loss
resultant from the fraud. However, their reason was that the drawer is
more culpable than the second party in allowing himself to be duped by
the imposter in the first instance.22 Can it be said that a drawer is a
culpable party when he draws a check in reliance on facts presented to him
by a trusted friend or business associate? At any rate, is he more at fault
than the bank which paid out on the instrument without checking to see if
the indorsement was that of a real payee?
Since it is doubtful that the drafters of section 3-405 (1) (a) intended
to equate the word "induce" with "cause," it is submitted that that section
requires that the drawer be directly persuaded by the imposter to issue the
check, and that "or otherwise" merely means that the imposter may use
other direct methods besides face-to-face or the mails, such as the telephone
or telegraph, to carry out his deception.
Edwin M. Goldsmith
TORTS - PARENTAL IMMUNITY - UNEMANCIPATED MINOR PERMITTED
TO SUE ESTATE OF PARENT WHOSE NEGLIGENCE CAUSED HIS INJURY.
Dean v. Smith (N.H. 1965)
Plaintiff, as next friend of her three minor children, brought an action
against the estate of her late husband for injuries sustained by the children
in an automobile accident allegedly caused by the decedent's negligence.
The decedent's liability insurance carrier intervened and moved for the
dismissal of the action on the ground that unemancipated children have no
standing to sue the estate of their parent. The suit was transferred without
ruling from the trial court to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire which
held that suits by or on behalf of unemancipated children for injury negli-
22. Leary, Commercial Paper: Some Aspects of Article 3 of the Uniform Coln-
mercial Code, 48 Ky. L.J. 199 (1960).
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gently inflicted by a parent in the operation of an automobile can be
maintained against such parent's estate. Dean v. Smith, 211 A.2d 410
(N.H. 1965). 1
With the instant case, the much maligned 2 doctrine of parental tort
immunity has suffered another setback in its attempt to withstand the
ravages of logical analysis, 8 judicial misgivings 4 and commentarial scorn.5
The conception and gestation of the immunity doctrine are embodied
in a trilogy of cases starting with Hewellette v. George.6 In that case the
court ruled that a child could not sue her parent for false imprisonment
because such a suit would disturb the peace of families and impair the
effective exercise of parental control and discipline.7 Tort suits by children
against their parents were similarly disallowed in McKelvey v. McKelvey s
and Roller v. Roller,9 both of which drew analogies from the husband and
wife immunity' ° and cited Hewellette v. George" for the proposition that
the rule of parental immunity was "well established."
From this sudden and unheralded inception the rule was extended to
encompass virtually all tort suits between parent and child 12 including
1. Overruling Worrall v. Moran, 101 N.H. 13, 131 A.2d 438 (1957).
2. See, e.g., 1 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS § 8.13 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 116 (3d
ed. 1964).
3. Comment, 26 Mo. L. REv. 180 (1961).
4. Virtually every case within the last fifteen years has contained some reference
to the growing judicial restlessness with the rule. See, e.g., Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa.
287, 303, 135 A.2d 65, 74 (1957) (dissenting opinion) ; Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d
642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
5. See Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 254, 163 A.2d 147, 154 (1960) (dissent-
ing opinion) and Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 474, 174 N.E.2d 718, 720 (1961)(dissenting opinion), for a list of recent adverse law review articles.
6. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). The court in that case is frequently credited
with originating the doctrine out of its own notion of the need for familial stability.
However, the court could have cited dicta from three earlier cases which would tend
to support the existence of the rule, namely, Gould v. Christianson, Fed. Cas. No. 5636(1836) ; Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885) ; Lander v. Seaver,
32 Vt. 114 (1859).
7. The facts indicate that the court rested its holding on three policies which
are closely related: first, the familial rights and duties between the litigants might be
impaired; second, the rights and duties between the tortfeasor's spouse and his litigat-
ing child might be impaired; and third, the highly desirable intra-family tranquility
might be disrupted. As will be discussed in this note, several of the exceptions to the
rule have been carved out at the expense of the second and third policies.
8. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903). The allegation was brutal and in-
human treatment.
9. 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905), overruled, Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 642,
251 P.2d 149 (1952). This case is often cited as a classic example of an application
of a rule to facts which do not support it. The court would not allow a daughter to
recover from her father who had raped her. The court renounced any "line drawing"
and mechanically stated that a suit would disrupt family harmony.
10. This analogy reappears regularly. The difficulty in its application is that the
two immunities are premised on entirely distinct propositions. Spouses are precluded
from suing each other primarily because of their legal identity and their consensual
union. The law has never implied a similar identity between parent and child. For
a thorough comparison of the two rules and a definitive study of their incidents to
date, see McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303
(1959) and McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REv. 521 (1960).
11. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
12. Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924) ; Miller v. Pelzer, 159
Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924) ; Fortinberry v. Holmes, 89 Miss. 373, 42 So. 799
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those for ordinary negligence.'8 By 1930 it was so thoroughly entrenched
that Professor McCurdy, in his exhaustive assessment of the evolution of
the rule,14 indicated that the only case squarely recognizing a cause of action
at law against a parent for tort was a recent Canadian case. 15 In the same
article he noted at least six policies relied upon by the courts in extending
the rule, 16 but the three most frequently cited traced their origin to
Hewellette v. George,17 namely, the potential harm to domestic harmony,
parental discipline, and the family exchequer.
The blanket application of the immunity doctrine to all parent-child
tort cases does not seem to have been seriously challenged until Dunlap v.
Dunlap' questioned its pertinence to factual situations where the policy
reasons for the rule did not apply. In an action for negligence brought by
a son, injured while working as an employee of his father, the court held
that immunity did not lie. In so concluding, it affirmed the broad policy
behind the immunity rule but suggested that it should not be applied indis-
criminately to all parent-child tort suits but should be restricted to those
factual situations where the dangers foreseen in Hewellette are present.
Therefore, since the plaintiff had been injured while working as an em-
ployee of his father who was covered by liability insurance there was no
need for the immunity.
The proposition that the granting of immunity to a parent should be
determined according to the facts of each case was subsequently lauded in
many jurisdictions but directly followed in few.' 9 Later courts continued
to adhere to the pre-Dunlap conceptual view that parental immunity was
an absolute bar to suits by children but allowed certain "exceptions" to
be engrafted onto the rule. Because of the debilitation wrought on the
rule by the formulation of these exceptions, many commentators believe
that they are harbingers of a future extinction of the rule.20
Exceptions to the application of the rule have developed where there
is a wilful tort ;21 some third party is directly liable ;22 the parent was acting
outside the scope of his ordinary parental duties ;23 the child was emanci-
13. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923) ; Matarese v. Matarese,
47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925).
14. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relationship, 43 HARV. L.
R~v. 1030, 1056 (1930).
15. Id. at 1067.
16. These reasons were: domestic harmony, parental discipline, depletion of family
finances, danger of fraud through stale claims after majority, possibility of succession
through inheritance, and the position of the family as a quasi-governing body.
17. Supra note 11.
18. 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930).
19. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
20. Supra note 2.
21. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) ; Mahnke v. Moore,
197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Teramano v. Teramano, 1 Ohio App. 2d 504, 205
N.E.2d 586 (1965) ; Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950) ; Borst v.
Borst, 41 Wash. 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952) overruling Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242,
79 Pac. 788 (1905).
22. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Aboussie v.
Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
23. The rule has been abrogated in Wisconsin except: 1) where the alleged
negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child, 2) where the
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pated ;24 or, in a limited number of cases, where the parent was covered
by liability insurance.25
Under another exception recognized by a few jurisdictions26 and per-
taining to the instant case, a child may bring an action if the negligent parent
has died and the suit is against his estate. This exception was impliedly
rejected in Hewellette v. George27 where, despite the tortfeasor parent's
death before trial, the Mississippi court persisted in its reasoning that the
preservation of family tranquility and parental discipline precluded the suit.
One of the first cases to clearly recognize the deceased parent excep-
tion was Davis v. Smith.28 Citing several lower state court decisions, the
District Court held that immunity does not extend beyond the life of the
deceased parent because, "where a parent or child dies the entire family
unit is dissolved. There is no relationship that public policy need protect;
the reason for the doctrine is gone and the cloak of immunity disappears." 29
Thus in construing the relevant public policy the court considered the
"parental" discipline to be that exerted by the deceased parent and the
"relationship" to be protected to be limited to the single one between plain-
tiff and defendant. This interpretation would appear to contravene the
policy ennuniciated in Hewellette. In Brennecke v. Kilpatrick,"° the lead-
ing case recognizing the death exception, the court reasoned that the
abrogation of immunity in husband and wife cases where one of the spouses
had died, was analogous, and contended that the relationship sought to
be protected was terminated by the death of the negligent parent. The
writer of the dissenting opinion vigorously assailed the validity of analogiz-
ing inter-spousal immunity to parental immunity and contended that to do so
was misleading.5 1 He postulated that while death might abrogate the
immunity in husband and wife cases, it did so only because it was premised
alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child, and 3)
where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion
with respect to the provisions of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services
and other care. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
24. Although this is frequently cited as an exception to the rule, it was never
really included in its original delineation, since in Hewellette the court implied that
no disability existed if the child were emancipated. Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745
(Mo. 1959); Glover v. Glover, 44 Tenn. 712, 319 S.W.2d 238 (1958) ; Wadoz v.
United National Indemnity Co., 274 Wis. 383, 80 N.W.2d 262 (1957).
25. Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935) ; Worrell v. Worrell, 174
Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
26. Jurisdictions which seem to recognize the rule are: Kentucky: Harlan v. Gross,
346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1961) ; Missouri: Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68(Mo. 1960) ; New Jersey: Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (1962) ;
Pennsylvania: Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954), Parks v. Parks,
390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957); Tennessee: Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354
S.E.2d 789 (1962). Those which expressly decline to follow it include: Rhode Island:
Castellucci v. Castellucci, 188 A.2d 467 (R.I. 1963) ; Wisconsin: Lasecki v. Kabara,
235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940); but see Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122
N.W.2d 193 (1963).
27. Supra note 11.
28. 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
29. Id. at 506.
30. 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960).
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on the protection of the single relation between a husband and his wife.
However, in parent-child cases, "the immunity springs from a disability
imposed by reason of public policy, the underlying reason for which is
a desire to protect the family relationship and interests, social and economic.
The reason for the rule may extend beyond the death of a wife, or a mother,
or a father." 32 In Harlan Natl Bank v. Gross53 the court summarily
disposed of the issue by viewing the public policy as the prevention of
"the disruption [of] a family relationship ' 8 4 holding that when a death
occurs this relationship no longer exists.
In each of the death exception cases considered above, although the
defendant had been covered by liability insurance the courts failed to weigh
its import and in one case expressly denied its materiality to the issue.8 5
This refusal to allow an exception where a parent, either living or dead,
is covered by insurance is almost universal in American jurisdictions, even
though the policy reasons for immunity are seemingly inapplicable.3 6 The
courts have offered one primary reason for this seeming paradox. They
contend that to allow suit because a parent is insured against liability
would be a raid on insurance companies by creating liability where it had
theretofore not existed. 7 The courts have been unpersuaded by the
counter argument offered in behalf of an insurance exception whose pro-
ponents insist that where a parent negligently inflicts injury on a child
an actionable wrong exists38 but because of the policy reasons given in
Hewellette the parent is shielded by an immunity which disables the child
from suing. Thus insurance does not create liability, which must be proved
just as in any other tort action, but is a helpful factor in determining
whether a parent should benefit from the immunity rule.
In Dean v. Smith,39 the New Hampshire court in allowing suit against
the estate of a deceased tortfeasor has expressly made insurance a material
part of its considerations and has articulated the argument employed by the
advocates of an insurance exception.
In measuring the effect a parent's death should have upon the immunity
rule, the court states that, "it is self-evident that the disruption of family
relations and the weakening of parental rights and duties are much less
likely to occur, if at all, when the child's suit is against the estate of a
32. Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 75 (Mo. 1960).
33. 346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1961).
34. Id. at 483. Here the child had died and its administrator brought action
against the surviving negligent parent. For a consideration of the effect state death
statutes have on such actions, see Comment, 26 Mo. L. Rlv. 205 (1961).
35. Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Mo. 1960).
36. See note 25 supra for the few exceptions.
37. The possibility of fraud and collusion between the parties has also been sug-
gested as a reason for disallowing suit where insurance is a factor. This seems to be
a makeweight in the case of parental immunity since the law allows suits between
good friends, master-servant, brother-sister and others where similar dangers exist.
See Turner v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 553, 89 S.W.2d 751 (1936).
38. Supra note 18.
39. 211 A.2d 410 (N.H. 1965).
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deceased parent. ' 40 Although Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross41 is cited for
this proposition, it does not seem that the court has accepted the implica-
tion of that decision. When the court considers "family relations" to be
part of the immunity policy it does not seem to be limiting the protection
afforded by the rule to the single relationship between plaintiff and defen-
dant.4 2 Thus while it is "less likely" that such a suit would cause family
discord, the mere fact that the negligent parent has died does not preclude
such a possibility. Therefore, the parent's death is not necessarily determi-
native of the withdrawal of immunity.
The court then turns to the effect of insurance. In assessing the
widespread use of liability insurance among motorists, the court affirms
its earlier holding in Levesque v. Levesque43 by noting that insurance
should not create a duty where none previously existed. However, insur-
ance "should be considered in determining whether the barrier preventing
an unemancipated child from obtaining redress for the wrongs inflicted on
him by the negligence of his parents should be removed. '4 4 Implicit in
this is a recognition that a parent always has a duty of care towards his
child but where a parent breaches this duty the child cannot enforce his
rights unless the policy reasons for immunity are negated. Thus the court
has not been lured into the specious contention that insurance creates
liability. By making the same factual analysis of the need for immunity found
in Dunlap v. Dunlap45 the court has relied on a process of reasoning that
other courts should find satisfying in evaluating the presence of insurance.
The real significance of Dean v. Smith46 will not be seen until the court
must pass on a case where a child is bringing action against a surviving
insured parent for ordinary negligence, alleging. no facts that give rise
to an exception. Subsequent interpretation of Dunlap has held that insur-
ance will not be a material factor unless coupled with some recognized
exception. 47 While Dean is susceptible to this restrictive construction it
would not be the most reasonable one in light of the clarity of the
court's language.
In recognizing a specific solution to automobile injury cases the instant
decision has erased an anomoly which has long plagued the courts. It is
hoped that this creditable position will not be emasculated by future limita-
tion to situations where the negligent parent dies.
Thomas Colas Carroll
40. Id. at 413.
41. 346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1961).
42. See note 7 supra.
43. 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954).
44. Dean v. Smith, 211 A.2d 410, 413 (N.H. 1965).
45. Supra note 18.
46. Supra note 37.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - THIRD PARTY ACTIONS -
ARIZONA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT DOES NOT BAR SUIT
AGAINST CO-EMPLOYEE.
Marquez v. Rapid Harvest Co. (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965)
While working in a lettuce harvesting operation, plaintiff was injured
by a truck driven by the defendant, a fellow employee. Although he had
been fully compensated by workmen's compensation payments, plaintiff
instituted this negligence action against the driver of the truck to recover
damages for the injuries sustained. The trial court, in dismissing the action,
held that the award under the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Act barred
plaintiff from maintaining the present suit. The Arizona Court of Appeals1
reversed, holding that neither the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Act
nor the receipt of benefits thereunder precludes an injured employee from
suing a co-employee whose negligence caused his injury. Marquez v.
Rapid Harvest Co., 405 P.2d 814 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965).
Prior to the passage of workmen's compensation acts, the only remedy
available to an employee injured through the negligence of either his
employer or a fellow employee was an action in negligence against the
tort-feasor. 2 The employee's right to recover against his employer, how-
ever, was subject to numerous defenses3 which, if established, left the
employee to bear the total cost of his injuries.4 In an effort to shift the
financial burden of industrial accidents to the business enterprise, all the
state legislatures adopted workmen's compensation acts.5 These statutes
were designed to compensate all injuries sustained by an employee in the
course of his employment irrespective of whether the employer was guilty
of any fault.6 Furthermore, they deprived employers of all their common
law defenses, and required, as a quid pro quo, that the injured employees
relinquish all common law rights in damages against their employers.
Workers were thus provided with a new and exclusive remedy for indus-
trial injuries.7
1. Although the appeal was originally to the Arizona Supreme Court, that court
referred it to the Court of Appeals pursuant to ARIZ. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 1,
§ 12-120.23 (1964).
2. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842) ; Priestly
v. Fowler, 3 M.&W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Exch. 1837); 2 LARSON, WORKMnN'S
COMPENSATION LAW § 71 (3d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]; 9 DEPAuL
L. R~v. 220, 221 (1959).
3. The defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow
servant doctrine were available to the employer. 1 LARSON § 4.30; 17 WASH. & LEE
L. Rgv. 315 (1960).
4. Empire Zinc Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Colo. 26, 77 P.2d 130 (1937);
1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 5 (perm. ed. 1941) [hereinafter
cited as SCHNEIDER].
5. Vukovich v. Ossic, 50 Ariz. 194, 70 P.2d 324 (1937) ; Kay v. Hillside Mines,
Inc., 54 Ariz. 36, 91 P.2d 867 (1939) ; Miller v. Scott, 339 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1960) ;
1 SCHNEIDER § 3; 39 VA. L. Rpv. 951 (1953); 17 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 315, 316(1960); 10 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 274 (1953).
6. 1 SCHNEIDER § 1; McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture:
A Study of the Liabilities and Rights of Non-employers, 37 TEXAS L. Rzv. 389,
396 (1958).
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However, the workmen's compensation laws of almost every state
preserved the employee's common law right to initiate actions against
"third parties."'8 Whether a fellow employee is a third party under the
terms of the Act is a question on which the courts are in disagreement.
This conflict is primarily attributable to the varying interpretations which
the different types of workmen's compensation statute have received.9 The
majority of courts operating under statutes containing no specific language
to the contrary have defined "third party" to incorporate all persons other
than the injured employee and his employer.' 0 Consequently, in these
jurisdictions a negligent employee is not immune from suit by a co-employee.
Other jurisdictions, however, either by specific statutory language or
judicial decision have excluded co-employees from the "third party" classi-
fication, thereby foreclosing the possibility of an action at law against
a fellow worker."
In order to effectively evaluate the instant case, it is necessary to
analyze both the general policy considerations for allowing an employee
to sue a co-employee in the absence of specific statutory language, and the
instant court's interpretation of Arizona's Workmen's Compenation Act.
The policy considerations usually advanced in support of the principle
that an employee may sue a fellow servant are: (1) a tortfeasor should not
be relieved of the consequences of his wrongdoing ;12 (2) if an action at
common law is disallowed, the hazards of industrial accidents will sub-
stantially increase;' 3 (3) compensation acts refer only to those standing
in the relationship of employer and employee and should not be extended
to impair rights and liabilities existing in other situations ;14 (4) the third
party co-employee has not contributed to the fund and therefore should
not benefit from it ;15 and (5) workmen's compensation laws are in deroga-
tion of the common law and should be strictly construed to preserve
common law rights and liabilities. 16
8. 2 LARSON § 71.00; Martindale, Third Party Actions Against Co-employees,
9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 297 (1960).
9. Allman v. Hanley, 302 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1962). In Ranson v. Haner, 174
F. Supp. 82, 85 (D.C. Alaska 1959), it was stated that "great stress has been laid in
the decisions upon the wording of the statute in the particular state where the question
arose." The difference in phraseology of the statutes has caused various state courts
to reach conflicting results as to whether or not an employee can sue a co-employee.
10. 2 LARSON § 72.00; Martindale, supra note 7, at 298.
11. Ibid. The majority of decisions holding that an employee is precluded from
suing a co-employee rely primarily on specific statutory language and do not analyze
the underlying policy considerations.
12. In Lees v. Dunkerly Bros., 103 L.T.R. 467, 468 (H.L. 1910), it was stated
by Lord Chancellor Loreburn: "I can hardly imagine a more dangerous or mischievous
principle than that which is sought to set up here .... But it is a very different
proposition to say that a man is not to be responsible for his own negligence .
See also 2 LARSON § 71.10; McCoid, supra note 5, at 445.
13. Judson v. Fielding, 227 App. Div. 430, 237 N.Y.S. 348, aff'd, 253 N.Y. 596,
171 N.E. 798 (1929) ; Tawney v. Kirkhart, 130 W. Va. 550, 44 S.E.2d 634 (1947)
Lees v. Dunkerly Bros., 103 L.T.R. 467 (H.L. 1910).
14. McCoid, supra note 5, at 445.
15. Schumacher v. Leslie, 360 Mo. 1238, 232 S.W.2d 913 (1950) ; Tawney v.
Kirkhart, 130 W. Va. 550, 44 S.E.2d 634 (1947) ; McCoid, supra note 5, at 445.
16. The court in the instant case maintained that it should preserve the employee's
common law action in the absence of clear language to the contrary because the Act is




Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1966
E 9RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Nevertheless, there are numerous justifications for the contrary posi-
tions. Thus, in Feitig v. Chalkley,17 the court reasoned that since injuries
caused by the negligence of employees represent an "inherent risk of doing
business," the cost should be borne by the business enterprise, and not by
the negligent employee.' 8
It has also been contended that a fellow employee should not be con-
sidered to be in the same category as an unrelated third party, since his
labor represents a substantial contribution to the income of the enterprise,
and so indirectly increases the funds from which workmen's compensation
is paid. Therefore, he should be eligible to benefit from the existence of
the fund. 19 A third person who is unrelated to the enterprise, however,
contributes nothing to the fund, and therefore has no claim upon a share
in the employer's immunity.
A further consideration is that employees are constantly in danger of
incurring liability. "It must never be forgotten that the co-employee, by
engaging in industrial work over a period of years, is subjected to a greatly
increased risk not only of being injured himself, but also of negligently
causing injury. '20 If a co-employee were subject to a large damage award,
"the ... beneficient effects of workmen's compensation might be offset by
the potential liabilities which confront the worker .... "21 For the negligent
employee is no better equipped to bear the burden of a substantial damage
award than his injured co-worker.
However, it has been argued that relieving a negligent employee from
his wrongdoing would cause him to become careless, and thereby vastly
increase the number of industrial accidents.22 But it may also be argued
that an employee's fear of potential heavy liability for his negligent acts
while "on the job" might hamper his efficiency and impair his relations
with his fellow employees. 23 Moreover, the employer has sufficient sanc-
tions to discourage carelessness, for example, the power to terminate em-
ployment, to "dock" the employee's wages, or to suspend him temporarily.
Surely, an employee who constantly causes injury to fellow employees by
his carelessness would find himself seeking other employment. Nor is
there sufficient evidence to conclude that the imposition of tort liability
17. 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73 (1946).
18. "[Ain injury by a fellow worker is an inherent risk contemplated by the Act,
and the burden of such industrial accidents should be shared by the entire enterprise
as an industrial cost." 17 WASH. & Lz L. Rzv. 315, 320 (1960) ; In McCoid, supra
note 5, at 446, it is concluded that the policy considerations of relieving a third party
were weakest in the case of negligent co-employees.
19. McCoid, supra note 5, at 446.
20. 2 LARSON § 72.20. The author also states that "perhaps one of the things he
is entitled to expect in return for what he has given up is freedom from common law
suits based on industrial accidents in which he is at fault." Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Supra note 11.
23. In 1 SCHNZIDR § 4 it is asserted that workmen's compensation is designed
to be more in harmony with modern methods of industry than the common law
liability for torts, which generally produced long, expensive litigation and ill-feeling
between the employer and employee. This would appear to be equally true in the
situation where an employee sues a co-employee. Clearly a lawsuit might lead to a
breakdown of the employee's harmonious relations with his fellow workers.
WINTER 1966]
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss2/8
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
upon employees would substantially lessen the possibility of industrial
mishaps.2 4 Such a proposition is at best conjectural.
In Bresnahan v. Barre25 the court stated that "one purpose of the
Workmen's Compensation Act was to sweep within its provisions all claims
for compensation flowing from personal injuries arising out of and in the
course of employment by a common employer ... ." If this is the avowed
intention of the legislature, the courts should not defeat it through a literal
construction, even though the Act be in derogation of the common law. 26
Although the reasons for allowing a common law action against a co-
employee have some logical foundation, the policy considerations opposing
this principle appear more persuasive in light of the socio-economic pur-
poses of workmen's compensation statutes. Therefore, it is submitted
that the Arizona Court of Appeals, irrespective of statutory language, did
not give complete consideration to the relative interests involved.
Policy determinations aside, it is further submitted that the court in
the instant case offered an interpretation of the relevant sections of the
Arizona Act which is at least questionable. Essentially, the statute provides
that an employee who is "injured or killed by the negligence or wrong
of another not in the same employ ... shall elect whether to take com-
pensation under this chapter or to pursue his remedy against such other
person." 27 The court reasoned that since no election was required when
an injury is caused by someone in the same employ, the injured employee
is not compelled to make such an election, and can claim both workmen's
compensation and an award for damages in a civil action. Therefore, the
court presumed that the legislature intended to sanction double recovery
when an employee is injured by a co-employee .2  In so holding, the court
reached an anomalous conclusion. Under the court's interpretation, an
election would be required only if the employee were injured by the negli-
gence of a third party totally unconnected with the business enterprise,
while if the injury were caused by a co-employee no such choice would
be required. Consequently, it would be more advantageous to an employee
to be injured by a fellow servant than an outsider, since double recovery
would be permitted in the former situation but not in the latter.
This approach was flatly rejected by the Supreme Court of Oregon
in Kowcun v. Bybee,2 9 where it was confronted with the same issue under
24. Supra note 18, at 449.
25. 286 Mass. 593, 597, 190 N.E. 815, 817 (1934).
26. 1 SCHNIDER § 6: "It has been said the workmen's compensation statutes are
'sui generis, and . . . create rights and remedies and procedures all their own.
Where the act is unambiguous, the common law has no application.
27. ARIZ. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, ch. 6, §, 23-1023 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
28. This is contrary to the generally accepted principle that double recovery is
to be avoided. 2 LARSON § 72.65. ARIZ. IRV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, ch. 6, § 23-1024
(1956), which deals with choice of remedy as a waiver of an alternate remedy,
:indicates an intent to permit only one recovery. See Meares v. Dixie Creameries, Inc.,
-9 La. App. 213, 120 So. 133 (1928).
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almost identical statutory language.80 The court, in holding that an em-
ployee is barred from suing a co-employee, concluded that to interpret the
statute to sanction an action at law would mean that the legislature intended
the injured workman to have "both an award of compensation and an action
for damages against a purported tortfeasor. . . . "3 A similar result was
reached in Sergeant v. Kennedy,8 2 where the Michigan Supreme Court,
pursuant to its Workmen's Compensation Act, held that co-employees share
the same immunity from suit as employers. The court stated:
We also wonder why the legislature would have needed to single
out and mention those in the 'same employ' at all if it was going to
leave things precisely as they were before? . . . [I]s it not more
logical to assume that the legislature intended some significance to
attach thereto and instead meant what it rather plainly if clumsily
seemed to be saying by the quoted portion of the amendment: (a) That
henceforth in these situations tortfeasor co-employees can no longer
be civilly sued .... 83
The court in the instant case, however, felt compelled to preserve the
employee's common law right of action in the absence of clear and un-
ambiguous language evidencing the intent of the legislature to abrogate
that right. It is, however, the court's function to seek out the legislative
intent and to rule accordingly.8 4 In a previous Arizona case, S. H. Kress
& Co. v. Superior Court,3 the court asserted that the "common law may
be changed by statute though it must be done expressly or by necessary
implication."6 It is submitted that if the statute involved in the instant
case, does not so change the common law by its terms, then it is certainly
the necessary implication of the statutory purpose to abrogate the common
law right of an employee to sue a fellow worker for negligence on the job,
and that by deciding otherwise, the Arizona court has construed the statute
in a manner contrary to the intent of its state legislature.
Arthur Brandolph
30. ORE. Riv. STAT. ch. 656, § 154 (1963). See also Koch v. Telluride Power Co.,116 Utah 237, 209 P.2d 241 (1949), decided under language identical to that of the
Arizona statute, UTAH CODg ANN. tit. 35, ch. 1, § 62 (1953), and Thompson v.
Kiester, 141 Okl. 69, 283 Pac. 1018 (1930), decided under similar language, OKL.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44 (1951); contra, Judson v. Fielding, 227 App. Div. 430, 237
N.Y.S. 348, aff'd, 253 N.Y. 596, 171 N.E. 798 (1929), the only case which has held
under similar language that an employee could sue a co-employee. This result was
overturned by subsequent legislation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 72 (Supp. 1964)
provides that a person "in the same employ" as the injured employee will not be liable
to him for compensable harm negligently inflicted.
31. 182 Ore. 271, 282, 186 P.2d 790, 801 (1947).
32. 352 Mich. 494, 90 N.W.2d 447 (1958).
33. Id. at 497, 90 N.W.2d at 450.
34. "All rules for the interpretation of statutes have for their sole objective the
discovery of legislative intent." City of Mesa v. Killingsworth, 96 Ariz. 290, 295,
394 P.2d 410, 413 (1964).
35. 66 Ariz. 67, 182 P.2d 931 (1947).
36. Id. at 71, 182 P.2d at 935. (Emphasis added.)
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